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Abstract Society is reliant on infrastructure services, such 
as information and communication technology, energy, water, 
and food supply, but also on governmental, cultural, and 
search and rescue organizations. The goal of project Kritis-
KAT at the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance in Germany is the development of generic criteria 
for the identification and evaluation of infrastructures regarded 
as “critical” for society. Acknowledging that full protection 
against all threats and cascading effects is not possible, the 
approach focuses on the impacts rather than the prevention 
of threats. The development of generic criteria requires the 
prioritization of infrastructures and identification of their key 
characteristics for civil protection purposes, risk management 
activities, and strategic proactive planning. For this purpose, 
the development of a national critical infrastructure priority 
inventory is based on a thorough examination of the range of 
criteria typically used in similar approaches. The specific focus 
of this paper is to identify and simplify essential characteristics 
of infrastructure criticality. The main outcome of this study is 
the development of common criteria generally applicable to a 
variety of infrastructures.
Keywords civil protection, criteria, critical infrastructure, 
criticality, national inventory
1 Introduction
Infrastructures are primarily conceived as technical struc-
tures, built by humans to facilitate the distribution of goods 
and services. For centuries, such infrastructures have existed 
and society has made itself dependent on such support. 
Progress and civilization are major drivers behind an ever 
increasing self-induced dependency on the mass-distribution 
of information, goods, and services. The availability of 
infrastructures provides high living standards in urban as 
well as in rural environments. Livelihoods are at the same 
time dependent on them and service interruptions are mainly 
perceived to be negative. Influencing factors for an increas-
ing dependency on infrastructure services are ongoing 
urbanization, economic globalization, and developments in 
information technology, for instance. These developments 
bring prosperity, but also expose society to new risks. One 
remarkable feature of infrastructures is that despite most of 
them being technical structures, they are almost invisible to 
the end user, the customer at home. There is an almost blind 
trust in the daily availability of essential services, which 
aggravates the element of surprise in a blackout. The criti-
cality of infrastructure services becomes most evident and 
visible in case of a failure, when services and resources are 
suddenly not available anymore. 
1.1 Demand for Simplified Concepts
There is a need for simple, feasible, and standardized criti-
cality analyses (Theoharidou, Kotzanikolaou, and Gritzalis 
2009) despite the wealth of knowledge already created. The 
development of criticality criteria, or infrastructure-related 
risk criteria, is an ongoing activity in many countries, for 
example Canada (Robert et al. 2003), the Netherlands 
(Vrijling et al. 2004), Switzerland (Swiss Federal Office for 
Civil Protection 2009), the United Kingdom (UKCO 2010), 
the United States (Moteff 2007), or even in some provinces, 
for example, British Columbia (PEP 2007), as well as within 
the EU for all European countries (EC 2008). Many more 
countries have published a strategy that typically is the 
preliminary step to the identification process, for example 
Australia (Australian Government 2010) and Germany 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2009). Critical-
ity analyses make use of different methods for the identifica-
tion of criticality. Expert and operator interviews provide 
a quick overview and crucial information. Calculations and 
modeling methods help to understand systems and improve 
prediction of failures. In principle, criticality can be identified 
by looking at the infrastructure elements or nodes, the flow 
of goods and commodities, customer needs, capabilities 
of search and rescue organizations, and resources for 
mitigation.
1.2 Demand for Criteria
Criticality criteria are often used to identify and rank infra-
structures in order to establish inventories, risk registers, and 
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protection priorities (Moteff 2004; Swiss Federal Office for 
Civil Protection 2009). Criticality criteria also have been 
reviewed (Theoharidou, Kotzanikolaou, and Gritzalis 2009) 
for specific aspects such as interdependency dimensions 
(Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001; de Porcellinis et al. 
2009). But common criteria for the identification of “critical 
infrastructures” and structured concepts for criticality analy-
ses are wanting. One reason is the confusion between key 
terms: risk, vulnerability, resilience, and criticality. Concepts 
and criteria for the identification of critical infrastructures 
vary wildly and at random use criteria typically employed 
in impact assessments, social vulnerability and economic 
damage assessments, capacity, capability and resilience 
studies, and other general risk parameters such as probability 
and damage extent. Although there are efforts to structure 
and identify the different approaches, for instance regarding 
systemic failures, consequences of failures, single-hazards, 
or all-hazard approaches (JRC/IPSC/TRVA 2007; Bonin, 
Doktor, and Habegger 2009), the difference between criti-
cality and other risk-terms is not clear. In most cases, infra-
structure criticality assessment is just another wording for 
risk, vulnerability, or resilience assessment of infrastructures. 
The differences in terminology could be just an academic 
curiosity. Nonetheless, the quest for standardized approaches 
is important for the cross-country analyses that are currently 
being carried out by the EC (EC 2008). 
This paper investigates simplified patterns valid for many 
infrastructures and infrastructure assessments. The objective 
is less to provide fundamentally new insights, and more to 
extract what are essential and common features that are 
typical for criticality. The paper starts with a conceptual 
discussion of the terms critical and criticality. Then criteria 
are described that can be used to measure criticality generally 
for most types of infrastructure.
2 What is Critical and What is an 
Infrastructure?
Critical infrastructures are infrastructures regarded as 
especially important for society. But what does “critical” 
mean and what defines whether the infrastructures are merely 
important as opposed to especially important? What are 
infrastructures and their components? These questions have 
to be answered before going deeper into the assessment of 
infrastructures. 
2.1 What is “Critical”?
The etymology of the term “critical” is strongly related to the 
concept of crisis and points to a crucial or decisive character-
istic, situation, turning point, or impending change (see, for 
example, Online Etymology Dictionary 2010; Merriam-
Webster Dictionary Online 2010). This section combines the 
various uses of the term critical in the context of infrastruc-
ture and identifies common essential features. This is done by 
determining which criteria can be used to describe what 
makes an infrastructure or its features critical. 
Analysis of the most common uses of the term critical in 
the critical infrastructure literature reveals two aspects: first, 
relevance; and second, risk. Relevance is indicated when 
a certain infrastructure is important for a large proportion of 
society. Risk occurs when the infrastructure becomes a threat 
to the community, for example, by not supplying the popula-
tion anymore. Many infrastructures are important, but only 
when they reach a certain critical threshold (size, relevance, 
or brittleness) is their criticality revealed. In a nutshell, 
criticality points to relevance at a threshold. For instance, 
criticality is very often defined as a type of significance 
revealed by the negative impacts of an outage (Federal 
Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2009; EC 2008).
The overall criticality of a given object of interest is 
related to two temporal phases of investigation: the object’s 
normal operation characteristics and its characteristics in case 
of a failure. Criticality, therefore, describes the relevance of a 
given asset, which can be described by capabilities such as 
load, or indirectly by the number of customers supplied with 
a product or service. This relevance is, however, critical at a 
certain decisive moment, here in the case of failure, when 
suddenly the service provided by the object is interrupted. 
2.2 Ways to Describe Criticality
There are at least two big questions behind the criticality of 
infrastructures: On what are we dependent? What would be 
the impacts of failure? Some studies use criticality assess-
ment as a preliminary step toward identification of priority 
areas, and later merge into a more detailed analysis of 
hazards, vulnerabilities, and risk (Federal Ministry of the 
Interior of Germany 2007). Most approaches identify risk 
elements or processes that carry large supply capacities. Some 
studies regard certain infrastructures as critical, or important, 
even vital (Luiijf, Burger, and Klaver 2003), irrespective of 
any imaginable impact.
Many studies that deal with infrastructure criteria, how-
ever, use consequence-based criteria to connect the supply 
capacities of infrastructures with impact scenarios of 
potential damage (EC 2008; Theoharidou, Kotzanikolaou, 
and Gritzalis 2009). There are numerous impact types, such 
as mortality, harmed people, economic damage, and image 
loss, among others. Impacts help direct the assessment 
towards the interests of the researchers. For example, for the 
task of a civil protection agency, the focus on human lives 
should be paramount.
There are at least three ways to describe criticality: 
(1)  Criticality might be described by regarding the internal 
relevance of an infrastructure, in short the maximum 
loss of service capability possible. This is the internal 
system capability;
(2)  Alternatively, the external impacts can be described, for 
example, the number of customers supplied; and 
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(3)  Criticality can also be described by the decisive 
capabilities needed to prevent, mitigate, or compensate 
for failures due to infrastructure impairment, for 
instance the 4Rs of resilience: robustness, redundancies, 
resourcefulness, and rapidity of Tierney and Bruneau 
(2007).
2.3 What is an Infrastructure?
An infrastructure is a structure utilized by humans for the pro-
vision of services and goods. Definitions for infrastructures, 
and specifically so-called critical infrastructures, can be found 
in international handbooks (Brunner and Suter 2008) and are 
officially defined for countries such as Germany (Federal 
Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2009). Natural or human-
environmental structures such as rivers are infrastructures as 
are technical structures such as pipelines. But infrastructures 
consist of components both visible and invisible. Infrastruc-
tures contain systemic and spatial features (Bouchon 2006), 
yet they also possess more organizational and other less 
visible facets. As an example for nontechnical infrastructure 
features, human staff is (often) crucial for creation, manage-
ment, and maintenance or repair of infrastructures. Moreover, 
functions and processes, such as organizational processes, 
laws and regulations, and a great variety of quality aspects, 
are all components that are indispensable for the functioning 
of infrastructure services. For example, the critical compo-
nent of the infrastructure finance system might be trust rather 
than a certain technical asset. Lastly, the environment and the 
so-called environmental services, such as natural resources, 
are essential components of many infrastructures. 
The following table shows a conceptual list of infrastruc-
ture components, deduced by a cross-sectoral analysis of 
the official critical infrastructure (KRITIS) sectors used by 
Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal 
Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance. This con-
ceptual consideration is also based on review of scientific 
literature and on both unclassified and classified documents 
by governmental agencies. Examples are provided for four 
component areas. The major purpose of Table 1 is to extend 
the focus from technical infrastructures to features such as 
human staff, various processes summarized as functions, and 
the environment in which the infrastructure stands and from 
which it takes its resources. The examples in Table 1 illustrate 
different types and characteristics of the respective infrastruc-
ture components. The components as well as the examples 
are not exhaustive and strive to construct a more holistic 
concept of infrastructure as compared to a purely technical 
comprehension of infrastructure.
2.4 Specific Aspects of a Criticality Assessment
The concept behind a criticality assessment is similar to a 
typical risk assessment. Especially for assessments of critical 
infrastructures, however, certain adjustments are typical: 
(1)  Only impacts due to infrastructure impairment or failure 
are considered, not direct impacts of hazards such as 
human staff killed by lightning;
(2)  External effects outside the hazard of place are impor-
tant. For example, a flood in region x can affect the 
energy supply in region y; and
(3)  Interdependencies and cascading effects leading to 
different impact entry-points must be evaluated.
The viewpoint of some national critical infrastructure pro-
tection programs (Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany 
2007) requires a focus on the consequences specifically 
due to the service failure of an infrastructure. The focus lies 
on mortality, economic loss, or other negative outcomes 
directly related to service interruption of infrastructures. In 
some cases, the hazardous aspects of certain infrastructure 
such as nuclear power plants, or the risks due to the failure 
of certain protection infrastructures such as flood walls or 
levees, are not considered. There exist political or administra-
tive reasons for this position and, sometimes, there is a lack 
of resources to cover all aspects related to infrastructure 
risks. 
Hazards can be internal or external to the infrastructure 
system. The all-hazard approach requires a concept that can 
be applied to all sorts of hazards, be they naturally induced, 
human derived, technology based, or any combination of 
these. Even more, hazards and interruptions of infrastructure 
can happen in remote regions and still impact the given 
infrastructure system or sector of interest. Examples are inter-
ruptions of the World Wide Web, the effects of the ash from a 
volcano in Iceland on air traffic in Europe, and blackouts of 
the power grid originating in one country and affecting other 
countries.
Infrastructures are linked together and the failure of one 
infrastructure, for instance the power grid, affects a wide 
range of other infrastructures, for example water supply and 
information technology. Criticality assessment needs to 
determine the consequences and damages of such interdepen-
dencies (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001). For the full 
picture on failure, it is necessary to capture second and third 
order consequences as well.
Finally, criticality assessment often faces many uncer-
tainties and limitations on access to data and information. 
Many assumptions and simplifications have to be made. For 
example, assuming complete failure of one element or node 
helps understanding of the importance of that one node for 
Table 1. Infrastructure components
Technical structures/
assets Human staff Functions Environment
Nodes
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the whole system. In a typical risk or vulnerability assess-
ment, all existing protection and mitigation measures would 
be considered, as well as the plausibility of failure due to one 
specific hazard. This is valid for a detailed risk analysis, 
but hampers the identification of the relative importance 
of infrastructure elements. Moreover, the surprise factor of 
unexpected new hazards or the unexpected extent of known 
hazards would be overlooked. The same is true for safety 
preparedness or measures regarded as sufficient for given 
scenarios. 
3 Common Properties of Criticality 
Criteria
Criticality is used in nuclear science to describe the condi-
tions necessary to produce a chain reaction. While a certain 
critical mass of uranium is necessary, also the temporal 
aspects and the quality of the enriched uranium, the heavy 
water, and other conditions all contribute to a successful chain 





3.1 Critical Proportion 
Critical proportion summarizes many aspects commonly 
denoted as most important in the assessment literature. 
Critical proportion contains aspects such as the critical 
number of elements or nodes of an infrastructure (USDHS 
2003, viii), choke points (USDHS 2006, 127), as well as 
critical number of services, size of population (Theoharidou, 
Kotzanikolaou, and Gritzalis 2009, 42), or magnitude of 
customers affected. In many cases the criterion might better 
be described by percentages or proportions rather than 
absolute values. Moreover, other aspects such as the critical 
spatial extent, outreach, scope (Theoharidou, Kotzanikolaou, 
and Gritzalis 2009, 39), or population density can be 
expressed with this criterion. It also captures criteria often 
sought to describe capacities for preparedness, response, or 
recovery, such as the number of redundancies, buffers, or 
other aspects of resilience (Tierney and Bruneau 2007); 
the same criterion may well describe the number of interde-
pendencies involved (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001). 
All aspects of criticality point to a certain threshold that, when 
crossed, starts to seriously affect an infrastructure system 
upon which depend other infrastructures or populations. The 
critical proportion can also be inverse. For example, certain 
very rare or specialized items such as rare earths exist in 
limited amounts, yet, their outreach and importance for the 
world market can be very high. 
Many sources dealing with criticality of infrastructures use 
impact criteria such as number of casualties, injured people, 
or economic damage (EC 2008). They all point to the same 
criterion, a critical proportion, expressed by different types 
of measurable impact. The critical proportion criterion has 
limited ability to capture nonquantifiable aspects, such as 
processes or other soft issues. This is an important issue 
to consider, since many experts, especially from the private 
sector, promote looking at organizational processes rather 
than specific products or elements. As soon as one process is 
identified as critical for the whole service delivery by one 
particular infrastructure, a deeper investigation will start to 
analyze which parts of the process make it critical. Here the 
critical proportion is a useful criterion especially as it is often 
easier to visualize physical elements, including human staff, 
that compose the processes. But less visible and countable 
elements of infrastructures are often key to understand 
criticality. At this stage, other criteria such as time or quality 
can be more useful.
3.2 Critical Time 
Critical time summarizes aspects such as duration of outage, 
speed of onset, and specific critical time frames, but also 
notes the capacities before, during, and after a crisis. The 
latter are, for example, Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), Mean 
Time to Recovery, Mean Time to Functionality (MTTF), and 
business continuity or interruption. Critical time covers not 
only on/off, yes/no cases but also gradual transitions. For 
instance, resilience, as an inherent feature of systems, 
includes temporal aspects such as change, in addition to the 
characteristic to “degrade gracefully when it must” (Allenby 
and Fink 2005, 1034). Resilience in respect to threat and 
hazard features is by some sources (Kahan, Allen, and George 
2009, 15) “characterized principally by time and not 
necessarily by geography or spatial location.” Adopting the 
resilience approach to criticality, temporal characteristics 
can be just as important as physical nodes or spatial location, 
not only regarding threats but also system robustness or 
emergency capacities. Combining the criticality of an ele-
ment or spatial extent of a failure with a temporal criticality 
characteristic enhances the criticality assessment. For gradual 
temporal transitions, however, the critical tipping point 
(Gladwell 2000), or threshold of criticality, is often difficult 
to determine. 
In many cases, the real scale of a disaster can only be cap-
tured by investigating the duration an outage or impact lasts. 
For example, the 2006 blackout cascading all over Europe 
affected several countries, but only for less than one hour. But 
what if it had lasted for days? Another example is the ash 
cloud produced by the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull. The 
eruptions interrupted international air traffic and left more 
than one million passengers on the ground (Chittenden and 
Swinford 2010). More research is needed to determine how 
close certain industries have been to serious business inter-
ruptions; some car manufacturers in Germany already had 
to reduce production. But what if the eruption had lasted 13 
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or 14 months as was the case the last time Eyjafjallajökull 
erupted in 1821? 
Other than duration, the timing of an impacting event can 
be critical. For example, public administration authorities are 
often difficult to describe as critical due to a distinct duration 
of failure. Were a failure to occur on the day when all the 
transactions for wages or benefits were due, however, the 
effects would be far more tremendous than during the rest 
of the month. Another example is public buildings or train 
stations during service hours or other public buildings such as 
conference halls. Most of the year a harmful event would 
cause no harm, but when many people or, for instance, all 
shareholders and managers of a company meet, this would be 
a critical, disruptive timing.
3.3 Critical Quality 
Critical quality summarizes aspects such as the quality of the 
service delivered (for example water quality), and includes 
public trust in (water) quality. One recent example is the 
case of food poisoning in Europe. By June 8, a strain of 
Escherichia coli had sickened over 2400 people in Germany 
and caused 24 deaths (Peter 2011). Raw vegetables, such as 
tomatoes, lettuce, and cucumbers, and later on bean sprouts, 
were suspected to be the source of the bacteria. This suspicion 
resulted in a sharp decline in the consumption of these vegeta-
bles, due in part to the precautionary advice by the European 
Commission and German health authorities. While the link of 
the infections to the vegetables remains uncertain, economic 
loss among European vegetable producers is high (Peter 
2011). The lack of quality or the loss of consumer trust in a 
product or service is a critical criterion that links infrastruc-
ture services to mortality, economic loss, or other unwanted 
outcome. 
The critical quality criterion captures also loss of trust in 
authorities, image loss of companies, and impacts on core 
values (Metzger 2004, 76). A lack of quality might seriously 
disturb the usability of the service delivered by infrastruc-
tures. Even when the technical structures, human personnel, 
and administrative organization are all in place and still deliv-
ering the good or service, it might be of no use because of lack 
of quality—whether that deficiency is real or only perceived. 
Quality includes identity and ethics and therefore highlights 
organizational processes that are the baseline for ensuring the 
integrity and operability of infrastructure services.
3.4 Generic Criticality Types of Infrastructure for a 
Quick-Scan
The combination of infrastructure components (Table 1) 
with criticality criteria allows construction of preliminary 
criticality types of infrastructures. Most of these are at least 
implicitly researched in many studies so that they might be 
described as typical or generic. Infrastructures are analyzed 
within physical, systemic, and spatial taxonomies (Bouchon 
2006, 23). They can be extended to incorporate temporal 
aspects. Generic criticality types for a quick-scan might be:
Generic physical/spatial criticality types
  Point types: single points of failure (SPOF) / choke 
points / nodes / (national) icons 
  Line types: linear connections / cascades / transfer 
stations / limited connectivity paths / linear networks
  Area types: mass item / viral distribution / non-linear 
networks / cloud-computing
Generic temporal criticality types
  Quick onset types: impact realization on human life or 
system functionality
 Slow onset types: failure duration, MTTR
  Time slot type: time delay, specific time frames, 
tipping points, “critical situations”
The use of criticality types helps determine what to 
identify as critical. The problem is that almost all assets of an 
infrastructure can become critical, if the proportion, time, or 
quality cross a certain threshold. Since this threshold is hard 
to determine, especially for nonlinear and interwoven infra-
structure systems, it is practical to have imprecise but fit-all 
types at hand for a quick-scan and first assessment. 
For the establishment of priority lists, the collection of 
single points of failure (SPOF) is important and useful for a 
quick-scan assessment. The relevance of unique, rare or spe-
cialized assets is obvious and the related redundancy question 
is a key feature of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
concepts (Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2007; 
JRC/IPSC/TRVA 2007, 20; German Advisory Council on 
Global Change 2000, 288). The opposite extreme to SPOFs, 
mass items, can also become critical when their quality is 
compromised or their network layout is exploited, for instance 
by malicious attacks using the internet or generally Informa-
tion Technology (IT). Especially in the example of the inter-
net it becomes evident that the network character, with a great 
many redundancies and decentralized servers, is by its nature 
very susceptible to viral types of hazards such as intentional 
attacks. Cyber crime exploits the decentralized, international-
ized, and externalized structure of the network. This has 
major implications for a characteristic that is generally 
believed to increase failure tolerance: decentralization 
(Perrow 1999). Centralization/decentralization would be 
another generic criticality type to examine in order to develop 
measures that reduce criticality. As with all generic criticality 
types described here, there is no black and white distinction—
all types are characterized by a high degree of ambiguity. For 
example, SPOFs are easy targets, but are at the same time 
predestined to receive priority security measures.
For infrastructure components that are less related to 
physical or spatial settings (Table 1) generic types can be 
found. For example, interdependencies in terms of the types 
of relation are differentiated as cyber, logical (Rinaldi, Peeren-
boom, and Kelly 2001), or societal (de Porcellinis et al. 2009). 
Other sources discuss types of systems or functional com-
ponents and their different use within systemic or spatial 
approaches (Bouchon 2006, 20, 23). 
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Infrastructures are not critical merely at nodes or hot spots. 
Pipelines and power poles can also become critical if the crit-
ical amount of affected assets is high enough. For instance, 
several power poles failed during a 2005 winter storm in 
Germany, leading to blackouts lasting up to seven days in 
some villages. As another example, the viral distribution of 
malware or denial of service attacks makes use of mass items 
such as telecommunication lines, servers, or personal com-
puters. A network may not go down when certain nodes fail, 
but only when a larger, critical proportion of the network 
fails. While line and network features have other risk charac-
teristics as compared to point features, all of them can become 
critical in their specific ways and should not be excluded from 
an assessment. 
4 An Application Example
Application areas that make use of generic criteria and a 
deeper conceptual understanding of what critical means in 
combination with infrastructure are found in research, risk 
management, and politics among other areas. Research ben-
efits from a conceptual debate about how to define criticality 
and how to measure it as well as from the results of case 
studies. But case studies of critical infrastructure often lack a 
theoretical framework and might benefit from a more holistic 
understanding. Risk management concepts employed by 
business, public administration, and nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) in the development arena also benefit from 
the extension of conceptual paradigms, but are more closely 
linked to the decision maker’s question: where do I need 
to focus my attention? CIP analyses often seek to identify 
priority areas for further risk management in order to reduce 
effort and costs. Risk assessments are often a key aid in the 
identification of risk hot spots, and in many aspects criticality 
assessments are very similar. In principle there are multiple 
ways to conduct such assessments: top-down or bottom-up, 
sector-specific or cross-sectoral, and so forth. The objectives 
of the researchers, risk managers, and decision makers all 
influence the choice of method, concept, and application of 
a criticality assessment of infrastructures. Therefore there 
are various possibilities for application and the following 
sections provide only an example of how to derive applicable 
specific criteria from the common criteria presented in the 
previous sections. The example demonstrates how these 
criteria are used for an assessment of critical infrastructures 
by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance in Germany.
4.1 Operationalization of the Criteria
A good common definition must be so broad and general 
that it can be applied for different uses, in this instance for 
different types of risk analysis or different types of infrastruc-
ture. Broad and general definitions are often difficult to use. 
Frequently definitions and conceptual frameworks must be 
adapted and made more explicit. The same is true for the 
common criteria of criticality as described in the previous 
section. These common factors (critical proportion, time, and 
quality) integrate many typical characteristics of critical 
infrastructures and provide ideas for the development of spe-
cific criteria. Table 2 contains a nonexhaustive list of possible 
examples of such criteria that result from a cross-sectoral and 
interdepartmental analysis of CIP literature, various case 
studies, and expertise on individual infrastructure sectors. 
Table 2 contains criteria that can be derived from the three 
generic criteria and criticality types in section 3. Many of the 
examples are criteria typically applied in studies on critical 
infrastructures. Table 3 uses two general aspects of criticality 
assessments as described in section 2.2—the criticality within 
a system, and the criticality for society. The criticality within 
a system, described by the internal infrastructure capabilities 
are, for example, the chain reactions resulting from the failure 
of a critical node or asset, and the capabilities to mitigate 
such failures. The criticality for society, in this case, the civil 
protection impact dimensions, is captured by two aspects, 
Table 2. Nonexhaustive criteria for various infrastructure types
Generic criterion Examples of specific criteria Examples of applications (many criteria are valid for almost all types of infrastructure)
Critical proportion Load, capacity, power, sales, turnover, etc. Traffic, logistics chains, power installed
Number of assets, nodes, interdependencies, 
redundancies, emergency capacities
Backup systems for power or information storage; emergency power
Amount of customers supplied For instance, the number of people supplied with drinking water
Outreach / spatial interconnectedness The single chemical plant in the world producing a key product
Critical time Failure duration Air traffic grounding due to volcanic ash
Mean time to repair, replace, restore the functionality Replacement time for a transformer station 
Mean time to react Police, fire brigade, medical units, media, early warning, crisis 
management
Timing of failure Coldest winter day; annual meeting of company leaders; day of 
distribution of welfare or pay checks
Critical quality Product or service quality Water or food quality, trust in finance, training of staff, feeling of security
Cultural or societal significance National cultural icons
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the number of people supplied by infrastructure services per 
regional unit and the critical time, the speed of onset to affect 
human life or health. The columns of Table 3 capture only 
a limited selection of the three generic criteria of section 3 
or the more specific examples in Table 2. Two key aspects 
of critical proportion are termed “top 10 suppliers” and 
“national icons / rare yet important key services or elements” 
(Table 3). These two key aspects are selected for their 
importance and rather intuitive comprehension by the users. 
Table 3 can be used to investigate several infrastructure 
sectors. 
Table 3 does not intend to suggest that other criticality cri-
teria should not be considered. Specifically, other aspects of 
proportion, temporal, and quality aspects must complement a 
thorough investigation of the criticality of infrastructures. 
In the following a simplified example of distinct criticality 
criteria is given which would typically be used to establish a 
national critical infrastructure inventory or priority list. Please 
note that this list is not related to a real case and the criteria 
are only examples, and not exhaustive. 
Table 3 shows a quite intuitive and accessible way to 
condense the complex set of possible criticality criteria. The 
idea is to start in a top-down approach with the biggest infra-
structures per country. The biggest infrastructures are those 
with the largest service output, production rate, or market 
share. Additionally, the most iconic or special infrastructures 
are collected, such as national monuments; also included are 
unique items such as the parliament. Very specialized and 
outstanding infrastructures with a distinct quality are collect-
ed here that may be rather unknown to the public but are 
world-wide market leaders of specific products or services. 
This national inventory is further filtered according to 
impacts on the population, which is the main scope of civil 
protection. The number of people affected, the spatial and 
international impact dimension, and temporal criticality 
factors are used here. Precise numbers are often difficult to 
assess. Alternatively, classes of coarse dimensions can be 
used, for instance, the differentiation of minutes, hours, or 
days of impact. Not all impact criteria must be provided, but 
it is recommended to use at least one. The more impact filter 
criteria are used the more precise the outcome will be. On the 
other hand, comparability with other infrastructure sectors 
will typically be hampered by data constraints. In principle, 
the link between infrastructure capabilities and civil 
protection impact dimensions is useful for identifying civil 
protection priorities on national, municipal, or household 
level.
There are obvious limitations in this simplified example. 
For example, Table 3 showcases a typical national inventory 
in a top-down approach. For the assessment of critical 
elements within a given infrastructure system, and especially 
on other spatial scales, other criteria and observation levels 
are necessary. For instance, inventory lists, but also criticality 
assessments in general, might look not just at the biggest or 
most iconic components but also at the weakest links, hubs, 
limits of emergency capacities, dependencies, and inter-
dependencies. Integrative and multi-level or participatory 
approaches might be considered to test, complement, or even 
replace the often one-sided and limited knowledge created by 
top-down approaches such as the one presented in Table 3. 
For example, bottom-up approaches and in-depth local 
studies are indispensable for precise data mining, for under-
standing the impact of failures on local households, and for 
risk analyses of concrete infrastructure components. 
4.2 Demand for Criticality Criteria within National 
Civil Protection in Germany
Criticality assessment using the criteria and the concepts 
outlined here is used by the Federal Office of Civil Protection 
and Disaster Assistance (BBK) in Germany in order to derive 
priority infrastructures. Those infrastructures identified are 
Table 3. A typical national critical infrastructure priority list for civil protection
Top 10 suppliers (for example by market 
share)
National icons / rare yet important key 
services or elements 
Infrastructure capability
Sector A 1 2 3 … 1 2 3 …
Sector B
…
Civil protection impact dimensions
Critical proportion / impact extent
Number of people supplied (by A1, A2, … B1, etc.)
Sub-national National Sub-national National
International Global International Global
Critical time
Impact realization = speed of onset to impact human 
life or health
X minutes, hours, days … X minutes, hours, days …
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relevant to the extent that their failure would result in intoler-
able effects for the public. The goal of the BBK is to preserve 
the well-being of the population in terms of the supply of 
services delivered by infrastructures.
Full protection against all threats and cascading effects is 
not financially viable for society (Apostolakis and Lemon 
2005, 361) and may not even be feasible. In the recent disaster 
risk discourse, alternative strategies have to be explored, such 
as vulnerability, resilience (Lovins and Lovins 1982), and 
their specific recent branches such as societal risk (Bonin, 
Doktor, and Habegger 2009) or community resilience (Boin 
and McConnell 2007, 54). Against a backdrop of unlimited 
failure and impact possibilities for all kinds of infrastructure 
services or sectors, a prioritization of critical elements, secu-
rity measures (Lauwe 2010), and vulnerabilities (Apostolakis 
and Lemon 2005, 361; Moteff 2004; Swiss Federal Office for 
Civil Protection 2009) is necessary. 
For this purpose, the project KritisKAT is developing a 
concept for the cross-sectoral identification, evaluation, and 
comparability of critical infrastructures in an all-hazard 
approach. Criticality assessment is a corner stone of the 
risk assessment of infrastructures methodology of the BBK 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2007). Kritis-
KAT implements actions of the German CIP strategy (Federal 
Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2009) and provides a 
concept for the criticality assessments carried out on national 
level and in collaboration with federal states, municipalities, 
and the private sector. The infrastructures that are inves tigated 
in KritisKAT are the respective critical infrastructure sectors 
that are defined by the Ministry of the Interior and used by 
the BBK (Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany 2009). 
The internal list of critical infrastructures has just been 
updated and now includes energy, information technology 
and telecommunications, transport and traffic, health, water, 
food, finance and insurance industry, government and public 
administration, and media and culture. 
Project KritisKAT’s goals are the identification of critical 
infrastructure elements and an assessment of impacts on 
society due to service interruptions in order to derive a prese-
lection of infrastructure sectors and branches for future risk 
analyses and risk management actions in civil protection. 
Deliverables are criticality criteria useful for an integrative, 
cross-sectoral, interdepartmental, and standardized concept 
for criticality assessment. The results of project KritisKAT 
will be used to consider a national inventory of critical 
components, to conduct risk analyses, and to outline risk 
management actions. The results of KritisKAT will foster the 
development of both strategic and operational civil protection 
goals regarding the interplay between critical infrastructures 
and society. 
The KritisKAT project fosters cross-sectoral and inter-
institutional collaboration within the federal office and with 
other public authorities and the private sector. It triggers other 
research such as a macroeconomic input-output analysis and 
societal risk goals. Project KritisKapa, a spin off from the 
work within the BBK and KritisKAT, will assess emergency 
capacities in the energy sector and possible thresholds for 
societal risk goals concerning civil protection. Thresholds 
of capacities on several levels—operator, civil protection, 
public authorities, and the population—are promising critical 
tipping points, useful for the development of societal risk 
goals. The outcome of KritisKAT will be used not only to 
frame recommendations for public authorities and private 
operators of infrastructures, but also to establish risk 
communication with civil society.
5 Conclusions
The main results of this paper are conceptual insights into 
what is critical and what constitutes infrastructures. Critical 
are nodes or hot spots. But also very important are line 
features and mass items. Networks and decentralized systems 
can also reach thresholds where impacts such as impairment 
or failure become intolerable for society. As another finding 
of this paper, infrastructure is more than just technical lines 
or physical assets—hardware. Temporal characteristics 
are paramount for identifying what makes infrastructures 
critical. Other soft issues such as organizational processes 
or even product quality also determine risks to and by 
infrastructures. 
This paper has outlined key characteristics and objectives 
of a criticality assessment—infrastructure components, both 
visible and invisible—established common criticality crite-
ria, and presented an example of how such generic criteria 
can be used in practical ways. The generic criteria and the 
specific operational criteria presented in this paper do not 
represent a directly applicable or exhaustive list of criteria for 
a specific assessment. As with most conceptual papers the 
emphasis lies in conveying general ideas that in later steps 
can be employed for assessments. The criticality assessment 
as described in this example formulates an elaborated 
hypothesis of what might potentially become critical. Such 
a criticality assessment does not replace a thorough investi-
gation of hazards, or any concise vulnerability, resilience, or 
risk assessment of system components. 
The three criticality criteria outlined in this paper can be 
applied to a wide range of different infrastructures in order to 
elicit the aspect(s) that makes them critical. There are two 
distinct reasons to suggest the utility of these general criteria 
despite the plethora of criteria already available in the litera-
ture: (1) they identify common denominators valid within 
most of the approaches that identify and rank criticality. This 
simplifies and reduces the confusing array of factors and 
provides reasonable coherence to analysis; and (2) they reveal 
criteria or subcriteria not considered yet in some approaches 
in literature. Examples are the variety of temporal aspects that 
constitute a critical threshold, or quality in all its various 
forms, which is often not considered, as well as most invisible 
features of technical infrastructures. 
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Limitations of this paper exist both conceptually and in 
application since the described common criteria, infrastruc-
ture components, and application are merely examples. The 
critical infrastructure approach does integrate many similar 
approaches to infrastructures. At the same time, this is not the 
only way to structure and conceptualize critical infrastruc-
ture. Likewise, this paper presents only a top-down type of 
assessment and application. Bottom-up approaches and other 
alternative approaches to infrastructure resilience might be 
another future issue to apply, test, and amend the proposed 
generic criticality criteria and infrastructure components. 
The paper does not debate the similarities and differences of 
criticality to vulnerability or resilience concepts. This might 
be a topic for future investigation. 
This concept and the criteria emphasize a focus on society 
and set the stage for the future development of societal risk 
goals. The focus of civil protection should be on society not 
on technical elements or processes within an infrastructure. 
Ultimately, it does not matter in respect to civil protection 
what the exact defect in an infrastructure is; it matters how 
people are affected.
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